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During the past several years, piracy off of the coast of Somalia
increased, despite efforts of the international community to support piracy
prosecutions in national and international courts. While some recent data
indicates an improvement in the number of attacks, it may be too soon to
tell the overall trend. In 2011, there were 286 piracy attacks,' which was
higher than in each of the three previous years, which had ranged from
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I.
U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Specialized Anti-Piracy
Courts in Somalia and Other States in the Region, 7, U.N. Doc. S/2012/50 (Jan. 20, 2012) [hereinafter
Jan. 2012 Report].
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140-160 attacks. 2 In 2010-2011, Somali pirates reportedly caused more
than $25 billion in losses 3 and pirates became one of the largest obstacles to
the delivery of food aid to Somalia. 4 Furthermore, piracy has threatened the
livelihood of African states, such as the Seychelles, by increasing costs at
ports, and affecting fishing and tourism. 5 Along with the increase in
attacks, the level of violence and mistreatment per attack has also risen in
certain cases, as has the average length of detention of victims by the
pirates.6 In Somalia, where most of the attacks are launched from, piracy
continues to fuel the economy, 7 and pirates benefit from a level of support
from part of the population. 8 In some coastal communities, an entire trade
is developing around the logistics that support piracy and approximately
twenty percent of the ransom monies are re-invested into the community,

2.
See generally James Kraska, Coalition Strategy and the Pirates of the Gulf of Aden and
the Red Sea, 28 COMP. STRATEGY 197, 197-216 (2009); Jim Michael, Pirates' New Tactics Make
Navies'

Job
Harder,
USATODAY.COM
Jan.
7,
2011,
available
at
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/printedition/news/20110107/pirates07_st.art.htm (last visited Jan. 30,

2013).
3.
See Roger L. Phillips, Upcoming Event: Panel on Establishment of a Special Anti-Piracy
Tribunal: Prospects and Reality, PIRACY-LAW.COM Feb. 5, 2012, available at http://piracy2
law.com/201 /02/05/upcoming-event-panel-on-establishment-of-a-special-anti-piracy-tribunalprospects-and-reality/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2013).
4.

U.N. Secretary General, Letter dated 24 January 2011 from the Secretary-General

addressed to the President of the Security Council (Somalia-Report of the Special Adviser to the
Secretary-General on Legal Issues Related to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia), U.N. Doc. S/2011/30,
Jan. 25, 2011, at 14 [hereinafter Jack Lang Report].
5.

Jack Lang Report, supra note 4, at 16; Victor Erofeyev, Save the Seychelles From Pirates,

NYTIMES.COM Jan. 11, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/12/opinion/12ihtederofeyevl2.html?_r=O (last visited Jan. 30, 2013); see also Allan Jacob, US Expresses Concern About
KHALEEJTIMES.COM
Feb.
15,
2011,
http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile/data/middleeast/201
Maritime,

available

at

1/February/middleeast

_February5l5.xml&section=middleeast (last visited Jan. 30, 2013) (quoting a U.S. counter-piracy
official, Donna L. Hopkins, as stating, "[w]e are very concerned that pirate ransom money is actually
undermining the development of sustainable legitimate economic activity such as fisheries and normal
maritime trade.").
6.

See Jack Lang Report, supra note 4, at 17.

7.
Jack Lang Report, supra note 4, at 17; see also Kathryn H. Floyd, Somalia's Stability and
Security Situation in Review, INT'L CTR. FOR POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM RESEARCH (July
2010). In 2009, piracy raised as much as $200 million, making it one of Somalia's most profitable
businesses; Douglas A. McIntyre, Somali Pirates Are Getting Rich: A Look at the Profit Margin,
TIME.com
Apr.
15,
2009,
available
at
http://www.time.com/timefbusiness/article/
0,8599,1891386,00.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2013).
8.
See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Modalities For the
Establishment of Specialized Somali Anti-Piracy Courts, U.N. Doc. S/2011/360, June 15, 2011, at 27
[hereinafter June 15 Report].
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minimizing local interest in accountability. 9 This has created mixed
incentives for the Somali government, both nationally and locally in taking
steps to prevent piracy and hold individuals accountable.
As one of many steps taken to address this piracy phenomenon, the
United Nations (U.N.) Secretary General appointed Jack Lang (Lang), the
former Minister of Culture and Education in France, as Special Advisor on
legal issues related to piracy and asked him to identify steps which could
improve piracy prosecutions.10 Lang completed his report in January,
2011.11 His recommended "first step" as part of an overall "emergency
plan" was the establishment of specialized piracy tribunals in Somalia and
Tanzania. 12 He argued that these specialized piracy tribunals would be
consistent with the "'Somalization' of solutions." 3 This article will
describe the development of the Lang Proposal over the past year; further
the article will address whether this Somalization is viable or whether a
variation on his theme is warranted.
I. JACK LANG'S PROPOSAL: Two SPECIALIZED SOMALI COURTS AND
ONE EXTRATERRITORIAL COURT

To address the growing piracy threat and respond to the Secretary
General's request, Lang proposed the creation of two specialized Somali
piracy courts: One in Puntland and one in Somaliland.1 4 These courts
would be standalone courts, solely handling piracy cases.1 5 Additionally,
Lang proposed the creation of an extraterritorial Somali piracy court to be
temporarily located in Arusha, Tanzania. 16 This court would also only
handle piracy cases and use Somali law, rather than Tanzanian or
international law. 7 Lang further proposed that as a cost saving measure,
this court could be co-located in the facilities of the International Criminal

9.
Lack of Effective Somali Government Root of Piracy Problem, Experts Say,
VOANEWS.com, Nov. 2, 2009, available at http://www.voanews.com/content/a-13-2009-04-16-voa4768733422/409931.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2013) [hereinafter Lack of Effective Somali Gov't].
10.
U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated 25 August 2010 from the Secretary-General
addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2010/451 (Aug. 25, 2010).
11.

See Jack Lang Report, supra note 4, at 1.

12.

Id. at 28, 38-39.

13.

Id.at28.

14.

Id.at38.

15.

See id.at38-39.

16.

Jack Lang Report, supra note 4, at 38-39.

17.

Id.
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Tribunal for Rwanda."8 Once the security situation in Mogadishu improves,
the court would move there. 19
To help strengthen their ability to handle the piracy cases, these three
courts would each operate in the Somali language and use Somali judges,2 °
who would hopefully have access to and training from international judges
and lawyers. The courts in Puntland and Arusha would have universal
jurisdiction over the crime of piracy under a new counter-piracy law, which
would require new legislation and training on how to implement these new
laws.2 ' With an improved privacy law, the Somaliland court would
continue to focus only on piracy acts committed by the people of
Somaliland or acts committed in its territorial waters.2 2 The Somaliland
court currently prosecutes acts of pirates for crimes other than piracy.23
Ensuring passage of these new laws would be an essential step in furthering
Lang's proposal.
Lang estimated that the cost of the tribunal for three years would be
approximately $25 million.24 Funding sources included several nations,
U.N. agencies, such as the U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and
"states that have contributed to the trust fund created by the Contact Group
on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia in January 201 o.25 In June 2011,
approximately $908,567 had been received; however, since then,
fundraising efforts have brought in millions more. 26
Nevertheless,
continued fundraising efforts are still necessary.
UNODC has already taken the lead on assisting third world countries,
such as Kenya and the Seychelles, to strengthen their ability to prosecute

18. Id. This court is only using the ICTR facilities as a cost-saving measure while the ICTR is
in the wind-down process and the jurisdiction for the ICTR does not cover the crime of piracy.
19.

Id. at 38-39.

20.

Id. at 40.

21.

Jack Lang Report, supra note 4, at 39.

22. Id. In Somaliland, the local government is only willing to take on piracy cases affecting
its citizens or on its territory or in its territorial waters.
23.

See June 15 Report, supranote 8, at 5.

24.

Jack Lang Report, supra note 4, at 44.

25. Id. at 45. The trust fund created by the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia
was known as "The Trust Fund Supporting the Initiatives of States Countering Piracy off the Coast of
Somalia." Id. at 27. This estimate does not include the cost of bringing international judges into
Somalia and Tanzania to provide mentoring and capacity-building assistance. See id. at 43-45.
26. June 15 Report, supra note 8, at 11; See also U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the
Secretary-General Pursuantto Security Council Resolution 1950 (2010), U.N. Doc. S/2011/662, Oct.
25, 2011, at 6 (However, pledges to the Trust Fund had been higher, indicating that about $8.3 million
had been received as of October 4, 2011.).
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piracy cases. 27 Much of Lang's proposal appears to leverage this existing

assistance. To increase detention capacity near the newly proposed,
specialized anti-piracy courts in Somalia, Lang's proposal also included the
construction of new prisons in Puntland and Somaliland. 28 The prisons
would receive corrections training from UNODC and would be subject to
local human rights monitoring. 29 Additionally, the Proposal established a
reintegration program by which former pirates would be provided the
opportunity to secure lawful employment upon release from any sentence
served. °
On April 11, 2011, the U.N. Security Council endorsed the
recommendation in Resolution 1976 by deciding "to urgently consider the
establishment of specialized Somali courts to try suspected pirates both in
Somalia and in the region, including an extraterritorial Somali specialized
anti-piracy court."'',
The Security Council challenged the Secretary
General to report on ways to accomplish this, including international
participation, support and assistance for the courts. Over the next two
months, Lang and a U.N. team examined the various aspects of his proposal
and assisted in preparation of the follow-up report, which was issued on
June 15, 2011.

II. MODALITIES FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SPECIALIZED
SOMALI-ANTI-PIRAcY COURTS

In the June 15 report, the Secretary-General asserted that the guiding
principle of Lang's report was "strengtheningthe rule of law in Somalia. 32
In discussing the modalities necessary to operate these new specialized
piracy courts, the June 15 report acknowledged the requirement for a new
Constitutional and legislative framework.33 Specifically, it raised concern
over the consistency between the proposed new piracy laws as applied
domestically and extraterritorially, the 1960 Constitution for the Somali
Republic, and the 2004 Transitional Federal Charter for the Somali

27.
See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Coumter Piracy Programme, November 2009,
available at www.unodc.org/document/eastemafrica/piracy/UNODCCounterPiracy-Pmgramme.pdf (last
visited Feb. 3,2013).
28.

Jack Lang Report, supra note 4, at 37.

29.

Id.

30.

Id.

31.

S.C. Res. 1976, at 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1976 (Apr. 11,2011).

32.

June 15 Report, supranote 8, at I (emphasis added).

33.

Id. at 4.
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Republic.34 To amend the 2004 Transitional Federal Charter, the June 15
report noted that one-third of the Transitional Federal Parliament would
have to make a motion to pass the amendment and two-thirds of its
members would have to support it.35 This could be very difficult to
accomplish in the current Somali political environment.3 6
The Lang Proposal made some recommendations that were already
consistent with ongoing training in Somalia. For instance, the U.N.
Development Program (UNDP) and UNODC had already been providing
assistance for piracy prosecutions in Somaliland and Puntland.37 They did
so by using the existing court system and existing law in cooperation with
the Transitional Federal Government and regional authorities in Somalia.38
These efforts have contributed to a number of piracy prosecutions which
are already underway in Somalia. 39 The piracy prosecutions taking place in
Puntland are based on a definition of "piracy" law that differs from the
U.N. Convention on the "Law of the Sea" definition.4 ° On the other hand,
prosecutions taking place elsewhere in Somalia are generally for crimes
other than piracy, such as illegal possession of weapons. 41 As such, the
new piracy laws created to strengthen prosecutions within Somalia are
critical.
The current UNDP and UNODC plans for assistance are designed to
strengthen Somaliland and Puntland's ability to prosecute twenty more
cases per year, with an average of ten pirates per case.42 These existing
UNDP and UNODC programs have also initiated construction of new
secure courthouses in both regions; however, they will still require
additional new equipment from donors, enhanced measures for court
security, and judicial training in criminal law and piracy.43 Given the
current level of training and education within the Somali court system,
future efforts to ensure international participation and expertise will be
essential. While international judges and prosecutors could travel to
Somalia to conduct training, any effort that involves their participation in
34.

Id.

35.

Id.

36.

Id.

37.

June 15 Report, supra note 8, at 2.

38.

Id. at 3 (emphasis added).

39.

Id. at 4.

40.

Id. at 4-5.

41.

Id.at5.

42.

June 15 Report, supra note 8, at 3. This would allow for prosecution of nearly 200 pirates

43.

Id. at 5-6, 8.
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the court process would require a new legislative basis. 44 In addition to the
courts, the UNODC is already working to strengthen the capacity and
standards within existing prison system facilities while concurrently
developing two new prisons over the next two years. 45 Each new prison is
designed to hold 500 additional persons and comply with international
standards.4 6
Since it is more likely foreign judges and prosecutors who would come
to Tanzania rather than Somalia, the extraterritorial Somali court located in
Arusha, Tanzania, is envisioned to further strengthen the rule of law in
Somalia by encouraging regional and international assistance to come to the
region .4 ' The June 15 report further noted that the establishment of a new
extraterritorial Somali court would require a new Constitutional and
legislative framework (similar to creating a specialized new piracy court
within Somalia), and would require similar analysis regarding consistency
with the 1960 Somali Constitution and Transitional Federal Charter.48
Alternatively, locating an existing Somali federal court outside of Somalia
would only require adoption of a Somali Constitution and the parliament's
establishment of a judiciary.4 9 While both measures require additional legal
authorities, the latter may be easier to accomplish since it uses existing
courts in Somalia rather than newly-created specialized ones.
III. STRENGTHENING THE RULE OF LAW IN SOMALIA THROUGH
ESTABLISHING ANTI-PIRACY COURTS: IS THIS A VIABLE GOAL?

The Lang proposal and the existing UNDP and UNODC programs are
all designed to strengthen the ability of the Somali courts to handle piracy
cases and contribute to the broader and important goal of strengthening the
rule of law in Somalia. To assess the likelihood of achieving this goal, it is
important to look at the preferences of the Somali government and the state
of the existing court system in Somalia.
To begin narrowly with the Lang proposal for specialized anti-piracy
courts within Somalia, the TFG and regional authorities have expressed

44.

Id. at 6.

45.

Id. at 8.

46.
Id. at 8. This prison program may actually be the very program that Jack Lang proposes in
his initial report, leveraging on the efforts already underway by the UNODC.
47.

June 15 Report, supra note 8, at 12.

48.

Id. at 13 (emphasis added).

49.

Id. (emphasis added).

312

ILSA JournalofInternational& ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 19:2

support for piracy courts within Somalia.5 ° However, they stated a strong
preference for strengthening the existing Somali court structures rather than
establishing new standalone Somali anti-piracy courts.5 Specifically, the
Somaliland Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that Somaliland would only
agree to prosecute cases in existing Somali courts rather than specialized
anti-piracy courts.52 This statement appeared to support efforts to
strengthen and increase the existing UNDP and UNODC programs rather
than the Lang proposal.
As for the establishment of an extraterritorial Somali anti-piracy court
to be located in Arusha, Tanzania, the June 15 Report indicated strong
opposition from the Somali government. 53 The U.N. consulted with the
relevant authorities in Somalia, including TFG's Deputy Prime Minister
and Minister for Foreign Affairs and its Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister of Development, Puntland's Minister of Maritime Transport, Ports
and Counter-Piracy and its Director-General for Counter-Piracy, and the
region Galmadug's Minister of Justice and of Fisheries.54 All of the
consultations revealed adamant opposition to a Somali court operating
outside of Somalia and preferred the option of placing the court somewhere
within Somalia.55 Although the Somaliland Minister for Foreign Affairs
did not officially oppose the extraterritorial court, he did state that he did
56
not think it was "a good idea.,
Given the current strong Somali federal and regional government
opposition to both an extraterritorial Somali court and specialized antipiracy courts within Somalia, it seems unlikely that the Lang proposals for
specialized anti-piracy courts can prevail in Somalia as a "first step" in this
overall "emergency plan." That said, there may well be an appetite for
morphing this proposal into an enhanced UNDP and UNODC-style
capacity building plan for Somalia, leveraging the existing court structures.
Accordingly, at this time it is worth exploring how to best strengthen
capacity in the existing Somalia justice system, taking a look at its courts
and prosecutions. The current Somali justice system is comprised of a

50. Margaret Besheer, Somalia Wants Piracy Courts on its Territory, VOICE OF AMERICA,
June 20, 2011, available at http://www.voanews.come/English/news/Africa/Somaia-Wants-PiracyCourts-on-its-Territory-124298529.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2013).
51.

June 15 Report, supranote 8, at 14-15 (emphasis added).

52.

Id. at 15. (emphasis added).

53.

Id. at 14.

54.

Id. at 14-15.

55.

Id.

56.

June 15 Report, supra note 8, at 14-15.
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national court system, with both district and regional courts,57 traditional
tribal law and shari'a, all of which function somewhat intermittently.58
Given that the current UNDP and UNODC capacity building efforts are
focused on the national court system, this should be the focus of continued
efforts on prosecutions. However, a relatively recent piracy law failed in
Parliament due to the concern that it conflicted with shari'a law.5 9
Furthermore, in March of 2009, the Somali TFG indicated that shari'a
would be the nation's official judicial system. 60 The interplay between the
regular court system and the influence of shari'a law is a theme that will
need to be watched as these efforts move forward. Additionally, there are
some concerns as to whether the Somali government will be politically or
legally able to enact the new piracy laws needed to strengthen domestic
piracy prosecutions.
In addition to the need for new piracy laws, the existing court system
has significant challenges. The courts and prisons are vastly underfunded
and poorly equipped. 6' Lang's report noted that only about 5% of the near
200 judges in Somaliland and Puntland had legal training.62 Additionally,
the UNDP assessed that less than 10% of the total judges and prosecutors in
Somalia had any formal legal training.63 Given the magnitude of the
capacity building effort needed in Somalia, effective fundraising and a
significant amount of time will be needed to enact the new piracy laws and
develop a strong international judge and prosecutor training and mentorship
program. 64
Next, it is important to determine whether investments in Somalia's
justice system will actually result in more successful prosecutions,
convictions and detention of pirates, or if the government has incentives to
avoid addressing the problem. There is skepticism regarding whether the
current Somali government can be the willing and effective partner needed
57.

Id. at 31. The "assize" section where piracy cases are heard fit in the regional courts.

58.

Jack Lang Report, supranote 4, at 34.

Betwa Sharma, UN Adviser: Piracy Tribunals Needed ASAP, HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 25,
59.
2011, available at http://www.aolnews.com/2011/01/25/un-adviser-piracy-tribunals-needed-asap/ (last
visited Feb. 3, 2013).
WIKIPEDIA.ORG,
of
Somalia,
60.
History
http://en.wikipedia/org/wiki/HistoryofSomalia (last visited Feb. 3, 2013).

available

at

61.

June 15 Report, supranote 8, at 3, 8.

62.

Jack Lang Report, supranote 4, at 38.

63.

June 15 Report, supranote 8, at 5.

64.

See Douglas Guilfoyle, Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia, InternationalCooperation in the

Prosecution

of

Somali

Pirates,

July

21,

2011,

available

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm2OlOl2/cmselect/cmfaff/writev/1318/m06.htm
Feb. 20, 2013) (written evidence provided by Dr. Guilfoyle to the UK Parliament).

at

(last visited
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for this effort, 65 and there has been indication that donors have been
reluctant to fund a government that has not been fully accountable.66
The Somali government indicated back in 2009 that it knew who the
pirate leaders were, with Somali Prime Minister Sharmarke stating "[t]here
is a lot of money flowing in ...we are following very closely how money
is distributed here. 67 He indicated a need for more resources and the help
of the international community to locate and prosecute the pirates.68 Some
U.N. sources indicated in the June 15 report that the key leaders of these
pirate organizations, including their locations in Somalia, are already well
known; further, the key leaders have political connections.69 While it is
clear that international assistance will be essential in strengthening the
ability of the Somali courts to handle piracy cases, there is still concern
over whether Somalia's political figures will actually carry through with the
prosecutions and detentions of pirates.
IV. HOW DO REGIONAL PARTNERS AND INTERNATIONAL DONORS VIEW
THIS PLAN?

To prepare for the June 15 report, the U.N. team met with the Minister
for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the United Republic of
Tanzania, who expressed Tanzania's support for hosting an extraterritorial
Somali court on its territory. 70 He indicated the need for additional security
measures, a Navy ship to defend the coast, and perhaps a few additional
facilities around the country to house suspected or convicted pirates. 71 He
also sent a letter indicating that the Arusha court should have a mandate to
prosecute individuals who provide logistical support, intelligence, and
financing for piracy; that the judges should include international and

65.

Lack of Effective Somali Gov't, supra note 9; See also Peter Spiegel, Gates Says Somalia

Government is Key to Problem, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL,

Apr.

14, 2009, available at

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123967368677815883.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2013).
66.

Khalil Senosi, AP: Somali government knows details on pirates, USA TODAY, Apr. 16,

2009, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2009-04-16-somalia-piratesN.htm (last visited Feb. 3,
2013).

67.

Id.

68.

Id.

69. June 15 Report, supra note 8, at 18. Current estimates indicate there are approximately 10-20
financiers, 50 main pirate leaders, approximately 300 leaders of attack groups and another 2,500 pirate foot
soldiers. Id.at 27; See also Louis Charbonneau, UN cites reports of govt links to Somalia pirates, REUTERS,

Mar. 18, 2009, available at httpJlwww.reuters.coni/ardcle/2009/O3/18fidUSN18379298 (last visited Feb. 3,
2013).
70.

June 15 Report, supra note 8, at 15.

71.

Id.
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Tanzanian judges as well as Somali for the best experience and diversity;
and that the UN should have a clear funding mechanism and funding for the
court 72 (presumably having concerns over the proposed "voluntary funding"
mechanism).73 Accordingly, if the Somalis and other regional states decide
to move forward and if adequate funding is achieved, Tanzania will
willingly contribute to this effort.
Among the other regional states handling piracy cases, the Seychelles
indicated its desire to continue with its own national prosecutions of pirates,
focusing on leaders and financiers.74 Additionally, Mauritius supported an
extraterritorial court, so long as it was hosted in another state in the region
such as Tanzania. 75 No country has appeared to arm wrestle Tanzania for
the opportunity to host an extraterritorial Somali court on its territory.
Nevertheless, it is likely that countries will continue their own national
prosecutions, hopefully with continued assistance from UNODC and others
to strengthen their capacity.
International donor nations, who were necessary to fund and support
the specialized piracy courts, had split views on the matter. The French and
Russian governments fully endorsed the Lang Report.76 However, the U.S.
supported a continuation of the current UNODC court and capacity building
programs within Somalia, arguing that this is the most effective way "to
meet the Lang report's goal of a 'Somalitization' of the anti-piracy
effort., 7 7 The U.S. did not support the extraterritorial Somali piracy court
due to the opposition within Somalia itself described above and the heavy
lift that would be required to establish such a court. 78 However, the U.S.

72.

Id. at 16.

73.
Id. at 25. The ICTR has operated in Tanzania under an "assessed" UN funding
mechanism, meaning that the UN member states pay for a portion of the court's operation as a
percentage as their regular UN dues. The more recently established African court, the Special Court for
Sierra Leone, operated under a "voluntary" contributions basis, requiring its leadership to spend a
significant portion of its time and effort raising money. The June 15 report indicates that for UNselected judges or prosecutors, Member States could determine that funding for the international
component be met using UN assessed contributions, rather than voluntary contributions.
74.

Id. at 16.

75.

June 15 Report, supranote 8, at 16.

76.
FRANCE

See Maritime Piracy, Adoption of UNSCR 1918 by the United Nations Security Council,
DIPLOMATIE,

April

28,

2010,

available at

http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/global-

issues/defence-security/organized-criminality/maritime-piracy/article/piracy-adoption-of-unscr- 1918-by
(last visited Feb. 7, 2013).
77. David Dunn, Ambassador and U.S. Alternate Representative for Special Political Affairs
to the United Nations, Remarks at a Security Council Meeting on Somalia (June 21, 2011), available at
http://usun.state.govibriefing/statements/2011/166707.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).
78.

Id.
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would support a dedicated piracy chamber or court in a third country in the
region such as in Seychelles or Tanzania, which could apply its own
national laws to prosecute pirates captured by the international naval
forces.7 9 Thus far, the efforts of Seychelles, Kenya, Mauritius, and even
Tanzania to prosecute piracy cases or prepare to do so have been
significant.80 A recent U.N. Security Council resolution co-sponsored by
India urging establishment of
"specialized anti-piracy courts in the region"
81
support.
unanimous
also had
V. WHO TO PROSECUTE?

While not addressed in the original Lang report, the June 15 report
raised the question of whether the extraterritorial court would prosecute
low-level "foot soldier" pirates or focus instead on high-level
financiers/plotters of piracy attacks.82 The report argued for the latter as a
"strategically effective and cost-effective means of supplementing current
prosecution efforts." 83 The unanimous U.N. Security Council Resolution
2015 also supported this idea, calling for prosecution of individuals who
84
"illicitly finance, plan, organize, facilitate, or profit from pirate attacks.,
Given the limited capacity of the current Somali system and other national
systems prosecuting pirates, it makes sense to focus significant effort on the
higher-ups, while continuing current efforts to stabilize Somalia. Given the
Somali opposition, the future of an extraterritorial court in Arusha,
Tanzania seems unlikely. The domestic Somali courts and other countries
willing to prosecute piracy cases should ensure adequate laws are in place
to support focused prosecutions on these higher-level individuals.
VI. PIRACY ELSEWHERE: DOES THIS EFFORT HELP THE
BROADER FIGHT AGAINST PIRACY?

Given the current attention to creation of specialized anti-piracy courts
in and around Somalia, it is worth asking what effect, if any, these courts
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2011,
available
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will have on piracy occurring in other parts of the world such as the South
China Sea and West Africa? This is particularly important when assessing
the costs, in light of limited amounts of donor funding, that may be
available to fund similar efforts elsewhere. Will this investment help to
deter pirate activity in other regions?
There does not appear to be empirical evidence or significant
commentary on this issue. It does seem likely that any effort to prosecute
pirates will contribute to a greater understanding of the crime itself and
successful tactics for prosecution of piracy. The current focused effort to
prosecute piracy on land, in the territorial seas of Somalia, and on the high
seas off of the coast of Somalia strengthens the principle that there will be
accountability for acts of piracy wherever they may occur. Further, these
pirates will not be able to seek refuge in destabilized areas. The increased
number of nations adopting piracy laws and exercising jurisdiction over
piracy cases in this region should encourage similar global efforts in other
regions affected by piracy.
Nonetheless, the current level of "tribunal fatigue ' 85 over the ad hoc
war crimes tribunals is a reminder that donors do tire of funding specialized
justice mechanisms and efforts. Since dedicated funding and specialized
piracy training may have collateral benefits for the local rule of law in
Somalia, it further strengthens the case to increase piracy prosecutions in
the regular court system. It is difficult to imagine a country more in need of
precious rule of law assistance and funding than Somalia, particularly if you
believe that the Somali government can be a willing partner in these
endeavors.
VII. CONCLUSION
A stable, economically viable Somalia remains one of the most
effective ways to discourage low-level pirates from engaging in this illicit
activity. Broader international efforts from the U.N. and elsewhere remain
committed to this stabilization plan. However, effective efforts to prosecute
pirates for these crimes have been underway in the region and have resulted
in more than 1000 pirates being held in twenty countries.8 6 This is
commendable, and a great step towards strengthening the principle of
accountability for acts of piracy wherever they may occur.
The Lang proposal for specialized anti-piracy tribunals may not have
been implemented in its entirety, but it stimulated both debate and action on
85.

See Guilfoyle, supranote 64, at 98.

86.
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the very pressing issue of piracy off of the coast of Somalia. However,
since November 21, 2012, the U.N. Security Council has pressed for
continued consideration of the establishment of specialized anti-piracy
courts. Yet, this term has taken on a new definition of a "court operating
under national law, with international assistance and with a focus on the
prosecution of piracy offenses. 88 Given the opposition to Lang's proposal
for specialized anti-piracy courts by the Somali federal and regional
government, Lang's proposal should be morphed into the current efforts to
strengthen the capacity of the existing Somalia court system, which this
new definition would support. This can be done through mainstreaming
piracy in the regular courts, perhaps by creating specialized panels within
these courts which are specially trained to handle piracy cases. Existing
UNDP and UNODC efforts should be the continuing basis for taking this
assistance forward as amplified in the Lang report. The notion of hosting
an extraterritorial Somali court in Tanzania or another country should be
abandoned due to opposition by the Somali government and the challenges
associated with getting it done. Third world country prosecutions should
continue with international assistance as they do in countries such as the
Seychelles, Mauritius, and Kenya, and consideration of establishing a
regional court that could operate under national legislation should remain a
viable and attractive alternative. Incredible progress for these courts has
occurred in the past several years, which include the establishment of a
regional prosecution center in the Seychelles. 89 The U.N. strongly supports
all of these efforts. 90 While the challenges associated with prosecuting
piracy cases in the region are significant, this "modified" Lang Plan-a
plan without specialized courts or an extraterritorial Somali court-offers
the best hope for success.
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